Objectives: There has been mixed evidence for age differences in wisdom-related knowledge across the adult life span. This study investigated two potential moderators of the link between age and wisdom-related knowledge: the wisdom criteria and the wisdom tasks. Method: To test these moderators, 40 younger and 40 older participants completed four wisdom tasks differing in contextrichness. Independent trained raters coded the resulting think-aloud protocols in terms of value relativism, as defined in the Berlin wisdom paradigm, and perspective taking, as defined by Grossmann. Results: The type of task did not show any main or interaction effects on the present two wisdom criteria. However, age differences in the two wisdom criteria were multidirectional: whereas perspective taking did not differ by age group, value relativism was lower in older than younger adults. In addition, value relativism, but not perspective taking, was related to measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence, whereas perspective taking, but not value relativism, was related to a measure of life investment. Discussion: This study provides evidence for the idea that value relativism and perspective taking are two distinct facets of wisdom-related knowledge. Implications for future age-comparative research interested in wisdom are discussed.
Societal beliefs suggest that wisdom-related knowledge is an attribute of older and experienced rather than younger and inexperienced individuals (e.g., Clayton & Birren, 1980; Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989) . However, the evidence for age-related increases in wisdom during adulthood and old age has been inconsistent (e.g., Ardelt, 2010; Grossmann et al., 2010; Thomas & Kunzmann, 2013; Wink & Helson, 1997) , clearly raising questions about potential moderators of the link between age and wisdom-related knowledge. The primary goal of this study was to examine two factors that may impact on age-related changes in wisdom-related knowledge, the wisdom criteria and the wisdom tasks.
Value Relativism and Perspective Taking: Two Wisdom Criteria
Wisdom-related knowledge has been defined as exceptional knowledge about difficult and uncertain life problems. The existing models of wisdom-related knowledge differ slightly in terms of the wisdom dimensions subsumed; however, there is a consensus that wisdom-related knowledge includes at least three core dimensions: awareness of the broader context of a given life problem, recognition of different perspectives, and acknowledgement of uncertainty inherent in any sense making of phenomena (e.g., Grossmann, 2017; Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003 Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Sternberg, 1990 Sternberg, , 1998 . In this article, our focus was on one of these core dimensions, that is, recognition of different perspectives. We were particularly interested in how this dimension has been defined and assessed in the context of two prominent wisdom models, that is, the Berlin model (e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005) and the model introduced by Grossmann (Grossmann et al., 2010) .
Value Relativism
In the Berlin wisdom model, recognition of different perspectives has been labeled value relativism and defined as the ability to (a) distance oneself from one's own perspective and personal values, (b) recognize and understand multiple perspectives when reasoning about a problem, and (c) tailor advice to individual situations.
As the three subdimensions of value relativism indicate, a key feature of value relativism has been to inhibit one's own point of view, decentralize, and gain a differentiated point of view. Thus, high value relativism clearly requires basic cognitive abilities such as inhibition, working memory, and logical thinking. However, profound personal experience with a problem at hand may not be sufficient or even necessary to score high on value relativism, given that a core feature of this criterion has been to consider a problem from multiple points of views and not primarily from one's own view and personal experience.
Perspective Taking
In the model introduced by Grossmann, recognition of different perspectives has been labeled perspective taking. Grossmann (2012 Grossmann ( , 2017 has differentiated three subdimensions: (a) consideration of nonobvious perspectives (i.e., information that is not a salient feature of a problem and how it is presented), (b) analysis of the problem from the viewpoint of the people involved, and (c) immersion of the self into the problem (Grossmann, 2012, p. 5) . This last subdimension seems to be critical to the concept of perspective taking, given that Grossmann has considered it a sign of high perspective taking if people continuously use first person when thinking aloud about a problem at hand and take the time to think about how they themselves would act when placed in the situation. Questions such as how would I act if I had the problem, what additional information would I consider, or what advice can I give to others, given my own experience are seen as being indicative of high perspective taking (e.g., Grossmann, 2012, p. 73) .
Given that perspective taking, as defined by Grossmann, does not explicitly require individuals to inhibit their own perspective, but can involve reference to one's own perspective and past experience, is arguably less dependent on basic cognitive functions and relies more on one's own experiences with a problem at hand than value relativism.
Multidirectional Age Differences in Value Relativism and Perspective Taking
Given the theoretical ideas discussed above, value relativism should be more vulnerable to age-related decline than perspective taking. More specifically, in comparison with perspective taking, value relativism relies more on fluid cognitive abilities (e.g., logical thinking or inhibition) that typically decline with age (e.g., Salthouse, 2009; Schaie, 2005) , but less on accumulated personal experience with life problems or life experience more generally that potentially increase with age (e.g., Ardelt, 2010; Mickler & Staudinger, 2008; Schaie, 2005) .
Consistently, Grossmann and colleagues (Grossmann et al., 2010) reported that perspective taking in the context of political intergroup and private interpersonal problems increased across age groups, at least in western cultures . In addition, perspective taking has been shown to be unrelated to measures of fluid intelligence and, only in some studies, positively related to measures of experience-based crystallized intelligence (Grossmann et al., 2010; Grossmann et al., 2012) .
By contrast, past studies using the Berlin wisdom paradigm have suggested that value relativism does not change with age (Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger, 1999) or even declines across age groups (e.g., Mickler & Staudinger, 2008; Thomas & Kunzmann, 2013) . In addition, value relativism has consistently been shown to be related to both types of intelligence, that is, fluid cognitive abilities and experience-based crystallized cognitive abilities (e.g., Mickler & Staudinger, 2008; Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997) . Finally, we identified one past study that suggested that value relativism is unrelated to experiences with life events that have led to self-insight (Mickler & Staudinger, 2008) .
In sum, although age differences in perspective taking and value relativism have not yet been investigated in one and the same study, the evidence generally suggests that perspective taking is an age-friendlier wisdom criterion than value relativism. In addition, perspective taking seems to be relatively cognitively undemanding, whereas value relativism has consistently been linked to cognitive abilities, including fluid cognitive abilities, which typically decline with age. Finally, although we could not find a study that investigated the link between life experience and perspective taking, there was at least one study, suggesting that accumulated experience with life events is unrelated to value relativism.
The Role of the Task in Age Differences in Wisdom Criteria
A second factor that may moderate the effects of age group on wisdom-related knowledge refers to the type of task used to assess wisdom-related knowledge. To begin, the tasks in the Berlin wisdom paradigm consist of very brief descriptions of hypothetical problems that provide little contextual information. In addition, participants are asked to think-aloud about the problem in responding to a relatively general and abstract question ("what could one consider and do when being faced with the problem?").
The participant basically engages in a monolog and, in this sense, the paradigm does not involve any social exchange about the given problem.
By contrast, Grossmann has developed more naturalistic tasks that are comparably context-rich in that they provide detailed information about the involved people, for example, their concerns, motives, and feelings. In addition, the interview itself differs from the Berlin interview in that the experimenter asks a series of relatively concrete questions that the participants successively answer. Thus, the experimenter enters into a dialogue with the participant and the paradigm involves social exchange about the given problem.
Taken together, the two paradigms discussed above differ in at least two aspects, the context-richness in which a given problem is presented and the social nature of the interview. Past research in different fields would strongly suggest that these two aspects co-determine the age-friendliness of a paradigm. More specifically, there is evidence suggesting that particularly older adults benefit from contextrich tasks that involve social exchange (e.g., Hess, 2014; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996; Sze, Goodkind, Gyurak, & Levenson, 2012) . Two mechanisms for such enhancement effects have been discussed in the literature (e.g., Kunzmann & Isaacowitz, 2017) . First, socially embedded tasks seem to be particularly meaningful and relevant to older adults, enhancing their task motivation and willingness to invest (cognitive) resources. Second, context-rich tasks draw on older adults' accumulated experience and rely less on agesensitive fluid cognitive abilities.
The Present Study
Our focus in this study has been on two wisdom criteria that were developed in separate research traditions, perspective taking, as defined by Grossmann, and value relativism, as defined by the Berlin wisdom group. We predicted multidirectional age differences in these two criteria, with perspective taking being higher in older than younger adults and value relativism being stable across age groups or even lower in older than younger adults. Given that the present German sample stems from a culture that is more similar to the United States than the Japanese culture, we predicted positive age differences in perspective taking rather than stable levels of perspective taking as shown for Japanese.
A second goal has been to test the role that the task may play in wisdom-related knowledge. We predicted that positive age differences in perspective taking, value relativism or both will be more likely if a wisdom task is contextrich and socially embedded rather than context-poor and embedded in a more private context.
A third goal has been to test two sets of variables as predictors of value relativism and perspective taking. A first set pertained to three measures of cognitive functioning, namely, perceptual speed and working memory as indicators of fluid intelligence and vocabulary as an indicator of crystallized intelligence. We predicted that value relativism would be more closely related to these three cognitive measures than perspective taking. A second set of variables referred to two measures of personal life investment, namely, the level of engagement with various life domains and perceived personal control over these life domains. Given the idea that value relativism requires individuals to put aside their own view and consider problems from perspectives that are not necessarily related to their own experience, we predicted that value relativism would show weaker positive associations with these two measures of personal life investment than perspective taking. This study can be considered an extension of a previous study that was based on the same sample of individuals (Rakoczy, Wandt, Thomas, Nowak, & Kunzmann, 2017) . In the earlier study, we were also interested in perspective taking, but compared performance in theory of mind tasks versus the Grossmann wisdom tasks. This study extended the earlier study in three respects: (a) we compared two wisdom criteria, that is, perspective taking, as defined by Grossmann, and value relativism, as defined in the Berlin wisdom paradigm, (b) we analyzed not only the think-aloud protocols pertaining to the wisdom tasks developed by Grossmann, but also think-aloud protocols pertaining to Berlin wisdom tasks, (c) we analyzed not only three academic cognitive abilities (speed, working memory, vocabulary), but also two indicators of life investment as predictors of perspective taking and value relativism.
Method

Participants
The sample comprised 80 participants. All participants were Caucasian and spoke German fluently. The 40 young adults, M = 24.35, SD = 3.76, range = 18-31, and the 40 older adults, M = 68.43, SD = 4.58, range = 61-78, were recruited via newspapers, the internet, and public notices/ flyers. As a compensation for participation, all participants took part in a lottery in which they could win one of 20 cinema and café vouchers (each 10 €). The sample was balanced by gender (53% younger and 48% older females). Older adults, M = 14.71, SD = 3.88, tended to report less years of education than young adults, M = 16.11, SD = 2.78, t (78) = 1.85; p < .07. Age group differences were also significant for occupational status, ÷ 2 (3) = 65.92, p < .001, and marital status, ÷ 2 (3) = 57.92, p < .001. Older participants were more likely to be retired, whereas younger adults were more likely to be students (employed: n young = 9, n old = 4; unemployed: n young = 3, n old = 1; student/apprentice: n young = 28, n old = 0; retired: n young = 0, n old = 34). Older participants were more likely to be married, whereas younger adults were more likely to be single (married: n young = 7, n old = 26; single: n young = 32, n old = 3; divorced: n young = 1, n old = 8; widowed: n young = 0, n old = 3).
Procedure
Data collection took place at the Universities of Leipzig and Göttingen. Given that there were no differences in the main constructs across the two subsamples, the data was collapsed for all subsequent analyses. All participants came into the laboratory for an individual interview of about 2 hr. In the first part of the session, participants were thinking aloud about four wisdom tasks. The two Berlin tasks and the two Grossmann tasks were presented in two blocks. The order of the two blocks as well the order of the two tasks within each block was counterbalanced. The two Berlin tasks presented two interpersonal conflicts in short hypothetical vignettes, whereas the two Grossmann tasks presented two interpersonal conflicts in two letters to a newspaper advice column (see Supplementary Appendix 1). At the end of the session, participants completed cognitive tests and a questionnaire covering demographic and psychological characteristics.
Measures
Wisdom-related knowledge Each transcribed think-aloud protocol was coded by two trained independent raters according to value relativism and perspective taking. The rater training and coding procedures for value relativism were obtained from the manual for the assessment of wisdom-related knowledge (Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes, 1994) . Following the established procedures, the two raters independently coded all protocols and assigned each protocol one score representing the degree to which the protocol matched the ideal definition of value relativism [scores range from 1 (no correspondence) to 7 (high correspondence)]. The Interrater reliabilities were acceptable (i.e., bedtime conflict: ICC(2,k) = .85, headstone conflict: ICC(2,k) =.80, friendship conflict: ICC(2,k) = .85, and marital conflict: ICC(2,k) = .82). For our statistical analyses, the codings of the two raters were averaged.
The rater training and coding procedures for perspective taking were obtained from the wise reasoning: technical manual (Grossmann, 2012) . During the coding process, the raters assigned each protocol one score representing the degree to which the protocol matched the ideal definition of perspective taking [scores range from 1 (no correspondence) to 3 (high correspondence)]. Following the procedure suggested by Grossman, 20 % of the protocols were double coded such as to be able to determine inter-rater reliabilities in terms of Cohen's Kappa (bedtime conflict κ = .66, headstone conflict κ = .98, friendship conflict κ = .80, marital conflict κ = .72). Acceptable interrater-reliabilities were also obtained when we computed ICC(1,1) coefficients (bedtime conflict: ICC(1,1) = .70, headstone conflict: ICC(1,1) = .88, friendship conflict: ICC(1,1) = .56, and marital conflict: ICC(1,1) = .65). For our statistical analyses, if two scores were available, they were averaged (for zero-order correlations among the task-specific wisdom criteria see Table 1 ).
To analyze age and task differences in the length of the protocols (as determined by the number of words), we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with age group (young vs old) as a between-subject factor as well as paradigm (Berlin vs Grossmann) and task (friendship vs marital vs bedtime vs headstone) as within-subject factors. This analysis revealed a main effect of task, F(1,78) = 11.22, p < .01, η p 2 = .13, and an interaction effect of age group and paradigm, F(1,78) = 6.52, p < .01, η p 2 = .08. Follow-up analyses of the main effect of task revealed that the protocols in response to the marital conflict, M = 548.80, SD = 304.00, and headstone conflict, M = 554.08, SD = 322.81, were both longer than the protocols in response to the friendship conflict, M = 489.11, SD = 247.45, and the bedtime conflict, M = 501.45, SD = 297.28. More critical to our prediction-relevant analyses, in response to the Berlin tasks, older adults' protocols, M =460.96, SD = 192.16, were shorter than younger adults' protocols, M = 576.95, SD = 297.98, t(78) = 2.07, p < .05. There was no significant age difference in protocol length in response to the Grossmann tasks, t(78) = −.03, p = .97.
Fluid and crystallized cognitive abilities
Given that processing speed is generally considered one of the best proxies for fluid intelligence (e.g., Salthouse, 1996) , participants completed the Trail Making Test Part A (Reitan, 1958) . In this part of the measure, numbers need to be connected in an ascending order. To also be able to consider a more complex indicator of fluid intelligence, participants also completed Trail Making Test Part B thought to primarily assess working memory (Sánchez-Cubillo et al., 2009) . In this part, participants have to coordinate two tasks, that is, connecting numbers and letters in an alternating order (1-a-2-b, etc.). The raw scores for the two test parts corresponded to the number of seconds needed to complete each part. Following the standard instructions, if participants made an error in either part, the mistake was pointed out to them and they were asked to correct it (with correction time included in completion time for task). We recoded the scores so that greater values correspond to higher levels of functioning and created an aggregate measure of fluid cognitive ability, given that the two raw scores were positively correlated (r = .61, p < .01). As a measure of crystallized intelligence, we considered vocabulary, as assessed by the multiple-choice word test (MWT-B) introduced by Lehrl (2005) . In this test, participants are instructed to identify the only one real, and, thus, correct word in a list of words that also includes four nonsense words. The test included 37 lists in total. The total number of correctly identified words served as a raw score indicating vocabulary.
Personal life investment
A first measure of personal life investment pertained to the average level of engagement with nine life domains (marriage, children, occupation, voluntary work, life reflection, independence, societal or political engagement, purpose in life, death and dying). For each of the nine domains, participants indicated the amount of energy invested in terms of action and thought on a scale from 1 (nonsignificant amount) to 5 (highly significant amount). A second measure referred to the average level of control over the nine life domains. For each domain, participants rated how well they have dealt with this domain on a scale from 1 (not well) to 5 (very well). The internal consistencies of the two scales were α = .53 (average engagement) and α = .63 (average control).
Results
Analytical Strategy
For each participant, eight wisdom scores were available given that participants were asked to think aloud about four wisdom tasks that were then coded according to two criteria. Given the hierarchical nature of our data, with wisdom scores (Level 1) nested within participants (Level 2), we computed multilevel models to examine our main predictions. All analyses were conducted with Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2010) .
Age Differences in Wisdom Measures and Wisdom Task Type
Two models were computed to test for age differences in the wisdom criterion measure, the wisdom task type, and the interaction of criterion and task type (see Table  2 ). In the first multilevel model, a dummy-coded wisdom criterion variable (0 = value relativism [Berlin paradigm], 1 = perspective taking [Grossmann paradigm] ), a dummycoded wisdom task type variable (0 = Berlin tasks, 1 = Grossmann tasks), and the interaction of these two variables was regressed on the participants' wisdom scores. The slopes of all three predictor variables as well as the intercept were allowed to vary between participants. In this model, the regression coefficient of each of the three predictors was essentially zero. We note that this result is not surprising as each coding task was normed prior to the analyses (i.e., using T-norms with a mean of M = 50 and standard deviation of SD = 10). More relevant for present purposes, the regression coefficients of the wisdom criterion variable, the wisdom task type, and their interaction significantly varied between participants, wisdom criterion: σ 2 = 10.56, wisdom task type: σ 2 = 10.59, interaction: σ 2 = 5.24, ÷ 2 = 13.07, df = 3, p < .01. In a second model, we included age to predict betweenparticipant variability in the intercept and the three slopes. The results revealed a significantly negative relationship between age and wisdom-related knowledge, suggesting that, overall, wisdom-related knowledge was lower in older than younger adults. The regression coefficients of the wisdom criterion variable, the wisdom task type variable, and of their interaction was again zero due to the norming of each wisdom task's coding prior to the analyses. Moreover, the regression coefficient of the cross-level interaction between age and wisdom task type did also not approach significance.
As predicted, there was a significant positive regression coefficient of the cross-level interaction between age and wisdom-related knowledge. The association between age and perspective taking was nonsignificant, however, there was a significant negative relationship between age and value relativism (see Figure 1) . Simple slope tests for cross-level interactions (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) corroborated these findings, perspective taking: b = −0.35, Note: Model 1 refers to the results of a random-intercept random-slope model in which the dummy coded wisdom criterion, the dummy coded wisdom task type, and the criterion × task type interaction was used to predict wisdomrelated knowledge. Model 2 was also a random-intercept random-slope model in which age was used to predict between-participant differences in the intercept and the slope of the three aforementioned predictors. z = −0.35, SE = 0.99, p = .73, value relativism: b = −3.04, SE = 0.947, z = −3.21, p = .001. We did not find support for our second prediction referring to an interaction effect between age, wisdom task type, and wisdom-related knowledge. Thus, the contextrich and socially embedded wisdom tasks, as developed by Grossmann, were not age-friendlier than the context-poor nonsocial Berlin wisdom tasks. Put differently, both task types elicited similar levels of wisdom-related knowledge as manifested in the two wisdom criteria and there also were similar age differences across task type.
In a final model, we included two variables as additional predictors because they differed by age group and showed significant zero-order correlations with one or both wisdom criteria, that is, protocol length and education. More specifically, protocol length was significantly correlated with an aggregate of the four value relativism scores, r = .70, p < .01, and an aggregate of the perspective taking scores, r = .75, p < .01. Education was positively related to the value relativism aggregate, r = .26, p = .02, but not to the perspective taking aggregate: r = .17, p = .13. In this model, age, the age × wisdom criterion interaction, and protocol length were significant predictors of the wisdom criterion, age: b = −1.85, SE = 0.752, p < .05, age × wisdom criterion: b = 2.69, SE = 0.875, p < .01, protocol length: b = 0.02, SE = 0.001, p < .01. All other regression coefficients did not approach significance. Thus, the effects of age on the wisdom-scores remained significant and unchanged after statistical control of the two covariates.
Cognition and Life Investment as Predictors of Two Wisdom Criteria
In a final set of analyses, we tested our measures of cognitive functioning and life investment as predictors of individual and age-related differences in the two wisdom criteria.
As seen in Table 3 , age was negatively related to the fluid ability aggregate and positively related to vocabulary. The associations between the cognitive measures and perspective taking were both nonsignificant. Although vocabulary was unrelated to value relativism, the association between the fluid ability aggregate and value relativism was significant and positive. As to the two measures of life investment, both were positively related to age. Neither engagement with life domains nor control over life domains was related to value relativism, but there were positive associations between both measures of life investment and perspective taking (although the correlation between one measure and perspective taking was only marginally significant).
To more formally test the contributions of the different cognitive and life investment measures on the wisdom scores, a multilevel regression model was fitted to the data in which either the value relativism scores or the perspective taking scores served as the dependent variable and the intercept was allowed to vary between participants. The respective intercept thus reflects the mean level of value relativism or perspective taking, respectively, across the four wisdom tasks. Age, the cognitive measures, and the measures of life investment were included as predictors of the between person differences in the intercepts. Furthermore, protocol length and education were included as covariates in the two models.
The model with value relativism as the dependent variable revealed that age and the fluid ability aggregate were significant predictors of these wisdom scores, age: b = −4.19, SE = 0.999, p < .01, fluid intelligence: b = 1.82, SE = 0.911, p = .049, whereby vocabulary was a marginally significant predictor: b = 1.53, SE = 0.838, p = .073. Other effects did not approach significance. The model with perspective taking as dependent variable suggested that engagement in life domains was a significant predictor, b = 1.55, SE = 0.697, p = .029. All other effects were nonsignificant.
Discussion
The present two facets of wisdom showed multidirectional age differences: whereas value relativism was lower in older than younger adults, perspective taking did not differ by age group. Although this evidence is consistent with our predictions, it deserves note that past studies were not entirely consistent, suggesting age-related increases (Grossmann et al., 2010) or stability in perspective taking and age-related decreases or stability (Smith & Baltes, 1990) in value relativism. At this point, it is difficult to provide a conclusive explanation for these inconsistencies, however, study differences in the samples or task contents may partly explain these inconsistencies. Even if age differences in wisdom-related knowledge are not entirely consistent across studies, however, there is a clear tendency for value relativism to be more prone to age-related losses than perspective taking.
The distinctness of value relativism and perspective taking was further corroborated by their differential associations with measures of cognitive functioning (which only predicted value relativism and not perspective taking) and measures of life investment (which only predicted perspective taking and not value relativism). It would be premature to conclude from this evidence that perspective taking does not involve cognitive processes at all or that value relativism is completely unrelated to real-life experiences. Future research with a wider range of cognitive and life investment measures is clearly needed.
In addition, it would be desirable to investigate the subdimensions of the two wisdom criteria separately. As discussed in the introduction, particularly perspective taking is a relatively heterogeneous wisdom criterion and its subdimensions may differ in terms of cognitive demand and the extent to which they rely on life experience. Similarly, age differences in these three subdimensions may not be parallel, with positive age differences in self-immersion and negative age differences in the other two dimensions that both may be relatively more cognitively demanding and less based on own experiences.
Despite these possible differentiations and the evidence for a distinctiveness of value relativism and perspective taking, it also deserves note that there was a relatively high positive correlation between the two wisdom criteria. This latter finding is consistent with the idea that, despite their distinctiveness, value relativism and perspective taking are both indicators of the overarching concept of wisdomrelated knowledge and, thus, share common features. More specifically, both criteria involve recognition of other people's perspectives. However, whereas value relativism also requires an inhibition of one's own perspective and tailoring advice to various individual situations, perspective taking allows a retention of one's own perspective and a drawing on one's own experiences.
It also deserves note that age differences in the more cognitively demanding aspects of perspective taking and value relativism arguably can be reduced through relatively simple interventions. More specifically, Grossmann and Kross (2014) asked younger and older participants to either take a first-person perspective (self-immersed condition) or a third-person perspective (self-distanced condition) when reasoning about a problem. A main finding was that older adults benefited from self-distancing just as much as younger adults. Thus, older adults may typically be less likely to engage in cognitively demanding processes such as self-distancing and, thus, may often score lower on cognitively demanding tasks and criteria such as value relativism than young adults do. However, this is not to say that older adults cannot perform at the typically higher level of young adults if they are particularly motivated to do so (for converging evidence from other realms: Hess, 2014).
Limitations and Outlook
Although this study has several strengths, it also includes several limitations that provide directions for future research. First, our focus in this study was on only two wisdom criteria. An important task for future research would be to assess additional facets of wisdom. For example, social-emotional strengths associated with wisdom (e.g., feelings of compassionate love and sympathy) may follow different age trajectories than cognitive strengths (e.g., transcendence of boundaries set by one's own biography or societal norms).
Second, although our focus on life investment as a predictor of perspective taking rather than value relativism is novel, the self-report nature of our measures can be seen as a serious limitation. This may be particularly true for our measure of personal control over life domains, given that older adults' subjective evaluations of their competencies often are not accurate reflections of what they actually can do. Thus, the present self-report measures need to be supplemented with more objective behavioral indicators of life investment.
Third, given the cross-sectional and correlational nature of this study, conclusions about intraindividual change in perspective taking or value relativism are strictly speaking not warranted. In addition, the causal nature of the relationships between wisdom criteria and cognitive functioning or life investment remains unknown. To gain a more comprehensive understanding particularly of the mechanisms that can explain multidirectional within-person changes in different facets of wisdom, a creative combination of longitudinal field studies and laboratory work is required.
Finally, we had predicted that context-rich and socially embedded tasks elicit greater wisdom-related knowledge than context-poor and individualized tasks. At this point, it is difficult to provide an explanation for the absence of the predicted task effects. One possibility is that the present tasks did not differ enough so as to differentially support the activation of wisdom-related knowledge. Tasks with even greater ecological validity may still contribute to an enhanced activation of wisdom-related knowledge, particularly in old age (e.g., tasks that involve actual conversations about real-life problems).
Conclusions
This is the first age-comparative study to investigate two wisdom criteria that have been developed in different wisdom traditions within the same sample of younger and older adults on the basis of different types of wisdom tasks that so far had only been used in separate studies. The present evidence strongly suggests that the multidirectional age differences in value relativism and perspective taking, reported in past work, were not the result of differences among studies in the type of wisdom task. Rather, the two wisdom facets seem to have different age gradients and be associated with different sets of variables. Thus, "to be wise about wisdom we need to accept that wisdom does -and wisdom does not-increase with age" (Vaillant, 2002, p. 256) .
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